Ambassador's Statement During

General Debates of the NPT Preparatory Committee

Ambassador Bahreini highlighted in his statement during the general debates of the 2nd session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2024: "Undoubtedly without Iran’s good-faith cooperation the IAEA couldn’t perform this unprecedented level of verification activities. Therefore my country deserves recognition for its commitment to and cooperation in safeguarding verification activities of the IAEA. The IAEA must conduct its verification activities in a professional impartial and independent manner."

Statement

By

Ambassador Ali Bahreini

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva

Before

The NPT Preparatory Committee

Second Session

Agenda item: General Debates

 Geneva, 23 July 2024

 

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

 Mr. Chair,

At the outset let me congratulate your Excellency Ambassador Akan RAKHMETULLIN on your appointment as the Chairperson of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the NPT. I assure you of my delegation’s constructive contribution and support during this session.

I associate my delegation with the joint statement of the Non-Aligned Movement delivered by Uganda.

Mr. Chairman,

Safeguarding the security of peoples through eliminating the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons was the main objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Maintaining the Treaty’s credibility and legitimacy depends on the attainment of this objective.

During the recent years the overall international security environment further deteriorated, international conflicts were on the rise, a full-fledged nuclear arms race continued for upgrading nuclear arsenals, modernizing and developing new types of nuclear weapons is continuing without any pause and the disarmament obligations remain unimplemented. Disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT that were part of package which led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and were reaffirmed during the 2000 and 2010 NPT RevCons, regrettably, have not been honored in the breach by the Nuclear Weapons States.

While some progress has been made in preventing horizontal proliferation, nuclear disarmament remains a key unfulfilled pillar. There are around 13,000 nuclear weapons globally, and the persistence of first-use doctrines, nuclear arsenal modernization, and nuclear arms races among nuclear-weapon States pose a serious threat.

NATO's nuclear-weapon States continue to uphold a first-use doctrine, fuelling a new nuclear arms race and undermining international peace and security. These are some of the major symptoms of the continued failure of the nuclear-weapon States to comply with their nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty and the relevant commitments undertaken in the NPT Review Conferences, including 13 Practical Steps of 2000 and 22 Action Plan of 2010 on nuclear disarmament. This systematic erosion and non-compliance with the obligations causes the most serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Treaty and has seriously undermined the confidence in the Treaty.

One of the most recent examples in violation of the treaty is the trilateral partnership between U.S., UK and Australia, named AUKUS to deliver nuclear submarines to Australia. This partnership is not only a mockery of the international non-proliferation regime but also a clear breach of the spirit and letter of the Treaty.

It is worth noting that the NPT will not be effective as long as some states believe nuclear weapons provide security. The risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional detonations unprecedentedly increased, and the propagation of smaller, tactical nuclear weapons increases the risk of escalation to a nuclear war.

As of 7 March 2024, with Sweden's accession to NATO, 32 countries, including Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, rely on the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. Five NATO states including Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands—host U.S. nuclear weapons under "nuclear sharing" arrangements, exemplifying proliferation and bypassing NPT obligations. The nuclear-weapon States are spending over $80 billion annually to expand and upgrade their arsenals, increasing the threat of nuclear weapon use.

Iran supports the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as outlined in Article IV of the NPT. However, imposing unilateral coercive measures (UCMs) by certain states, such as the US, against civil nuclear cooperation hinders peaceful nuclear energy use. States must respect the rights and obligations under Article IV and accomplish their obligations therein to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology by all without any discrimination and or conditionality.

After the initial proposal by Iran more than 5 decades ago in early 1970s for establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in spite of all efforts including 1995 resolution and the continued international calls, the realization of that aspiration has been blocked by the Israeli regime under the support of the US and its western allies. It has rejected, violated and ignored all international regimes on weapons of mass destruction, continues to be the only impediment in realizing such a zone, and remains on its non-adherence to the NPT and other international disarmament instruments. The international community must hold the Israeli regime accountable for its nuclear weapon program and force it to join the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards.

Iran remains committed to the NPT and works constructively with the IAEA to ensure transparency and compliance with safeguards agreements. To that end, Iran has allowed extensive IAEA inspections. Just in 2023, Iran was subject to 485 inspections amounting to 22% of all IAEA inspections, despite having only about 3% of the world's nuclear facilities. This volume and level of inspection have never been carried out in any country before in history. Undoubtedly, without Iran’s good-faith cooperation, the IAEA couldn’t perform this unprecedented level of verification activities. Therefore, my country deserves recognition for its commitment to and cooperation in safeguarding verification activities of the IAEA. The IAEA must conduct its verification activities in a professional, impartial, and independent manner.

Mr. Chair,

In order to have a successful Review Process of the Treaty, the status of implementation of all provisions of the Treaty across its three pillars should be assessed and reviewed in a balanced manner, but the current situation with regard to stalemate on nuclear disarmament front can’t be ignored. This situation requires greater attention to the urgent need for the implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments. It is not hard to see that the future of the Treaty depends primarily on the implementation of article VI by nuclear weapons States. We should spare no effort in ensuring the full and effective implementation of the Treaty as the best way to preserve the credibility of this fundamental instrument.

 

Thank you.