Ambassador's Statement During NPT Preparatory Committee on

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Ambassador Bahreini highlighted in his statement during Cluster Debate on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation” of the 2nd session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2024: Iran remains fully committed to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and continues its close cooperation with the IAEA. The Director General's 2024 report indicated no diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The IAEA must conduct safeguards activities impartially and independently avoiding reliance on intelligence agency information.

Statement

By

Ambassador Ali Bahreini

Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva

Before

The NPT Preparatory Committee

Second Session

Agenda item: Cluster Debate on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation”

 

Geneva, 26 July 2024

 

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

 

Mr. Chair,

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Nuclear proliferation remains a critical challenge to regional and global peace and security. The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and allow the NPT to continue contributing to international peace and security is through the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Articles I to VI of the Treaty and ensuring universal adherence to it.

Articles I and II of the NPT establish the central non-proliferation obligations of the States Parties. Most of the non-nuclear-weapon States adhere to these undertakings. However, certain European non-nuclear-weapon States in NATO continue to receive and host U.S. nuclear weapons, breaching their Article II obligations. The US, by transferring its nuclear weapons to Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, and training their air force pilots, violates its non-proliferation obligations under Article I of the Treaty.

Iran is deeply concerned about this growing practice of nuclear sharing and calls on the U.S. and these European nations to cease their violations and comply fully with their Treaty obligations.

The continuation of such unlawful practices encourages other non-nuclear-weapon States to follow suit. Poland has announced its intention to participate in NATO’s nuclear weapon sharing, and high-level officials in the Republic of Korea and Japan have discussed similar possibilities. We urge these countries to observe their non-proliferation obligations strictly.

The Preparatory Committee should recommend that the 2026 Review Conference establish a new Subsidiary Body within Main Committee II to focus on the ongoing breaches of non-proliferation obligations under Articles I and II through nuclear weapon sharing.

Universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East is essential to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Israeli regime's nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to regional security. All States Parties to the NPT should prohibit nuclear cooperation with the Israeli regime so it accedes to the Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon party and accepts the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards and additional protocol.

Achieving the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is the responsibility of all States Parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States and the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 resolution. Progress towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is an urgent necessity. The illegal nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime must be addressed to eliminate the region's imminent security threat.

The IAEA safeguards system plays a critical role in verifying the non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses. Iran remains fully committed to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and continues its close cooperation with the IAEA. The Director General's 2024 report indicated no diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The IAEA must conduct safeguards activities impartially and independently, avoiding reliance on intelligence agency information.

Attacks or threats against nuclear installations, as noted by the IAEA General Conference and Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are serious threats to regional and global security and violate international law. Nuclear installations should not be attacked or threatened under any circumstances. However, the Israeli regime has frequently committed such attacks and assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists with impunity, supported by certain Western countries, including the US.

We note the IAEA's statement on the limitations of the old small quantities protocol (SQP) and we attach great importance to amend or rescind its old SQP to enable proper IAEA monitoring and verification.

Nothing in the NPT prohibits non-nuclear-weapon States from developing naval nuclear propulsion reactors for non-proscribed activities. However, cooperation between the UK, the US, and Australia under the AUKUS partnership, involving the transfer of weapon-grade nuclear materials and the development of nuclear submarines, raises serious proliferation concerns and risks prompting a nuclear arms race in East Asia and the Pacific region.

In conclusion, the NPT, resting on three pillars—disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy—plays a key role in curbing nuclear proliferation. States Parties must remain vigilant and proactive in addressing challenges to the Treaty's integrity and effectiveness, including the modernization of nuclear arsenals, transfer of technology to non-parties, and nuclear sharing arrangements. By reaffirming our commitment to the Treaty and working collaboratively, we can achieve a world free of nuclear threats.

Thank you.