Statement Before NPT Preparatory Committee on

Negative Security Assurances

The statement delivered by Mr. Heidar Ali BALOUJI Head of the Islamic Republic of Irans MFA Department for Disarmament and Arms Control during the 2nd session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2024 in Geneva is as follows:

 

Statement

By

Mr. Heidar Ali BALOUJI

Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

to the United Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva

Before

The NPT Preparatory Committee

Second Session

Agenda item: Cluster Debate on Negative Security Assurances

 

Geneva, 25 July 2024

  

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

 

Mr. Chair,

My delegation aligns with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their use or threat against non-nuclear-weapon States will persist. The only absolute guarantee against this is nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the NPT has not eliminated the danger of nuclear weapons use against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Any use or threat of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States contradicts Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, international law, and humanitarian law, constituting a crime against humanity. The International Court of Justice's 1996 advisory opinion states there is no legal authorization for the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and their use would generally violate international law.

Pending total elimination, nuclear-weapon States shall provide effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, and irrevocable legally binding security assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances.

Despite repeated calls in NPT Review Conferences and UN General Assembly resolutions, no progress has been made. The 2022 Review Conference draft final document merely reflected the dangerous policies of three NATO nuclear-weapon States, which allow the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

We call on these nuclear-weapon States to renounce their irresponsible nuclear policy of first use against non-nuclear-weapon States and to adopt a no-first-use policy, as China has. However, no-first-use policies alone do not provide unconditional, irrevocable, legally binding assurances.

Some nuclear-weapon States argue that legally binding negative security assurances should be granted only within nuclear-weapon-free zones. Yet, none of these zones have received "unconditional and irrevocable legally binding assurances." Additionally, many NPT non-nuclear-weapon States are not in these zones, and establishing such zones in some regions is uncertain.

Unilateral or multilateral statements by nuclear-weapon States about security assurances are limited, ambiguous, conditional, and fail to meet the requirements of universal, legally binding, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory, and irrevocable security assurances. These statements justify the use of nuclear weapons through vague concepts like "defending vital interests."

Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States should be a priority. The Conference on Disarmament should promptly initiate negotiations to create such an instrument to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Pending this, the Preparatory Committee should recommend to the 2026 Review Conference the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances. This body should aim to achieve a meaningful, action-oriented result, including an unambiguous commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State under any circumstances.

I am delighted to inform you that my delegation has submitted a working paper outlining our perspectives on this agenda item. I encourage you and all delegations to review it thoroughly and consider our viewpoint.

Mr. Chair,

To reflect on some ideas raised by a few delegates under Cluster one, I would like to very briefly highlight the following points:

On nuclear disarmament verification we have repeatedly abstained on the relevant UNGA resolution as the Group of Governmental Experts, whose selection is based on political considerations rather than clear and agreed-upon criteria.

From our perspective, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) must focus on disarmament alongside non-proliferation. The Western advocates of the FMCT seem unconcerned about the disarmament aspect and addressing the existing stockpiles of fissile material. This stance goes against the consensual outcome documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. Therefore, as a way out, sticking with the consensual language is the best option to bridge the gap between differing views on this matter.

There were some references to arms control within the framework of the NPT, however, we underline that the focus should remain on the main goal without being sidetracked by politicized differences that unfortunately are being raised time and again.

Certain NWS's must heed that their lip service to nuclear disarmament will not be convincing when their words do not match their deeds.

Lastly, nuclear disarmament requires transparency, accountability, and concrete actions, free from strategic competition among nuclear powers.

 

Thank you.